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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRENT "W" BROWN,

]

Plaintiff/Appellant,

]
]i

vs.
GERALDINE K. BROWN,

Case No. 890293-CA

]

Defendant/Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF COURT
The Order and Judgment which modified a 1986 Decree of
Divorce previously entered was signed and entered by the Court on
April 7, 1989.

The Notice of Appeal was filed May 4, 1989.

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this matter
by virtue of the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1
et seq., Section 78-2a-l et seq. Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended), and Rule 3 R. Utah Ct. App.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from an Order and Judgment signed by the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen of the First Judicial District
Court of Cache County, State of Utah.

The Order and Judgment

modified a 1986 Decree of Divorce signed and entered by the same
court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

increasing alimony and child support where Geraldine Brown failed

to meet her burden of showing a substantial change in
circumstances necessitating the increase.
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion and

misunderstood or misapplied the law by increasing alimony and
child support where Geraldine Brown produced no evidence of a
necessity for the increase or of her inability to aid in her own
and the children's support, and the Court made no findings on
necessity and ability, the Court focused its ruling only on an
increase in Brent Brown's income.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the modification of a divorce decree.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
After a trial, Brent Brown and Geraldine Brown were divorced
by a Decree of Divorce signed and filed by the District Court on
March 28, 1986.
On or about December 14, 1987, Geraldine Brown filed a
petition to modify the Decree of Divorce.
Trial on the petition to modify was held on February 28,
1989, before the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen.

Judge

Christoffersen signed and filed the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment on April 7, 1989.
Brent Brown filed this appeal on May 4, 1989.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The relevant portion of the Decree of Divorce provided,
based on a finding of a minimum of $54,000.00 per year income to
-2-

Brent Brown, that Brent Brown pay Geraldine Brown $300.00 per
month per child in support for each of the Browns' three children
and $200.00 per month alimony.
The relevant portion of the Order and Judgment modifying
the Decree provided, based on a finding of $72,000.00 per year
income to Brent Brown, that Brent Brown pay Geraldine Brown
$700.00 per month per child in support for the two remaining
children, and $500.00 per month alimony.

Geraldine Brown was

also awarded a $3,000.00 judgment against Brent Brown for
attorney fees and costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Brent Brown and Geraldine Brown were divorced by Decree

of Divorce on March 28, 1986.

(Record 50-2.)

the decree, Brent Brown was unemployed.

At the time of

In setting child support

and alimony, the trial court imputed income to Brent Brown.
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the trial court's findings made at the time
of the decree state:
7. That although [Brent Brown] is
currently unemployed, his past work record
and potential means that he is reasonably
expected to obtain employment in the very
near future at $54,000 per year, upon which
child support is set at $300 per month per
child, payable one-half on the 5th and onehalf on the 20th of each month. That
[Geraldine Brown] should be ordered to
execute any papers necessary to allow [Brent
Brown] to claim the children as income tax
deductions.
8. That [Brent Brown] should pay to
[Geraldine Brown] the sum of $200 per month
as and for temporary alimony notwithstanding
[Brent Brown's] unemployment.
(Record 45-9.)
-3-

2.

The decree awarded Geraldine Brown custody of the

parties 1 three minor children subject to liberal and reasonable
visitation rights to Brent Brown.

Brent Brown was ordered to

maintain health and accident insurance and to split up to $600.00
of any deductibles with Plaintiff to cover the expense
thereafter.

Plaintiff was ordered to maintain life insurance

with the children named as beneficiaries.
3.
parties.

The decree valued and divided property owned by the
Paragraph 11 of the trial court's findings made at the

time of the decree states:
That the parties have acquired the following
property during their marriage: Home in
North Logan, $275,000; six acres in North
Logan, $95,000, subject to an approximately
$10,000 liability for bringing utility and
irrigation systems to the property previously
sold to Dr. Hawks; one-seventh interest in
four acres at 18th North in Logan; one-fourth
interest in 28 acres at Bear Lake, $15,000;
one-fourth interest in the Salt Lake metal
building, $25,000; two percent interest in 29
acres Temple View Salt Lake City, $20,000;
hangar for aircraft, $10,000; 1985 Buick Park
Avenue, $10,000; 1983 Buick Century $4,500;
1981 Buick Riviera, $6,000; 1983 19-foot
power boat, $10,000; 1979 aircraft, $80,000;
1985 Ford 1210 tractor and accessories,
$9,300; 1982 1100 Suzuki motorcycle, $2,000;
profit sharing fund with ISE, $59,212.58;
one-half interest in BH Leasing, $20,000;
silver, $6,000; furnishings in the home in
North Logan, $25,000; personal property with
[Brent Brown], $3,500; furnishings in [Brent
Brown's] apartment, $2,390; severance pay
from Brae Corporation, $20,000; income tax
refund 1985 subject to any tax payable and
costs of preparation, approximately $2,200;
IRA accounts with $6,372 in [Brent Brown's]
name and $4,840 in [Geraldine Brown's] name;
Merrill Lynch accounts, $191,679.69; and
North Park Bank stock, no value.
-4-

That [Geraldine Brown] should be awarded the
home, valued at $275,000, the Buick Century,
Buick Riviera, and the Ford tractor and
accessories, valued at $19,800; and the
furnishings in the home valued at $25,000 and
the North Park Bank stock of no value; and
[Geraldine Brown] should be awarded the
balance of the property except for the Brae
severance pay which should be split between
the parties, the net income tax refund,
which should be split between the parties,
and each party should be awarded their IRA
accounts with [Brent Brown] paying to
[Geraldine Brown] $766 for the difference.
[Geraldine Brown] should be awarded
$108,016,13 of the $191,679.69 of the Merrill
Lynch account for 56.352 percent of the said
fund.
4.

Subsequent to the divorce, one of the three children

reached the age of majority.

At the time of the modification

hearing, two children were minors:

A son, 13, and a daughter, 7.

(Transcript, page 17, lines 21-25; page 18, lines 1-6.)
5.

Subsequent to the divorce, Geraldine Brown turned the

management of her investments to a financial planner, Aaron
Lichfield (Transcript, page 43, lines 14-25; page 44, page 45,
lines 1-12; page 58, lines 7-25; pages 59-71), received
approximately $10,000.00 per year from the investments
(Transcript, page 82, lines 12-23), chose not to sell the home
(Transcript, page 72, lines 5-21; page 84, lines 7-25; page 85,
lines 1-16; page 119, lines 16-25; pages 120-121; page 122, lines
1-17), in the approximately three years since the divorce took
four college courses at Utah State University totaling 17 hours
of credit (Transcript, page 867, lines 20-25; pages 87-87; page
90, lines 9-14; page 111, lines 13-25; pages 112-115; page 117,
lines 20-25; page 118; page 119, lines 1-15), did not decide
-5-

what field to pursue in school (Transcript, page 89, lines 1-7),
has not looked for a job (Transcript, page 89, lines 8-25; page
90, lines 1-10; page 109, lines 19-25; page 110; page 111, lines
1-12; page 116, lines 17-23), planned

to take eight or more

years to graduate from college (Transcript, page 90, lines
11-14).
6.

Geraldine Brown stipulated at the time of her deposition

that except for a lack of skills, she has the ability to work.
In response to Brent Brown's counsel's question, she and her
counsel stated:
Q. And in addition, aside from the
limitations you've given, you're healthy and
have the ability to work?
A.

Define "ability."

Q. Well, you can go to work for eight
hours a day.
Mr. Jewell: We acknowledge that.
stipulate that she has the ability.
Q.

We'll

All right.

(Deposition of Geraldine K. Brown, taken January 4, 1989, page
58, lines 17-23. )
7.

Geraldine Brown's living expenses decreased from the

time of the divorce decree to the time of the modification.
Neither the original decree findings nor the modification
findings refer specifically to the living expenses of Geraldine
Brown.

The only evidence produced on Geraldine Brown's expenses

was testimony given by Geraldine Brown in response to Brent
Brown's counsel at the modification trial:
-6-

Q. All right. Now, let me just ask you
these questions. We know what you are
talking about now the time of the decree, the
court set your living expenses at $2,200.
That's what he found your living expenses to
be on a monthly basis is $2,200. If you take
$2,200 and you multiply that by 12 months,
your monthly living expenses are right around
$26.4. That's what the judge saw at the time
of your divorce. Now, if you look at your
monthly expenses over '86, f 87 and f 88, you
were very close every year to that $26.4,
aren't you?
A.

Yes, that's right.

Q.

In fact, in '86--

A.

Not this year.

Q. In '86 you were right on it. In '87
you were a little high. And in '88 we
analyzed a figure of $25.5. You are below
it, right?
A.

That's right.

Q. At $25,500 during 1988 your living
expenses right now are $900 lower than they
were at the time of the decree of divorce.
Correct?
A. That's right. I'm trying to cut
back every where I can.
Q. And you were asked explicitly in
your deposition whether or not your costs and
expenses have generally increased. And it's
true, is it not, that you testified that your
cost and expenses have not increased since
the time of entry of decree of divorce. That
is the truth, is it not?
A.

Well, it's not totally true, no.

Q. Let me turn you to page 44 of your
deposition. I'll ask you if these are the
questions and answers you gave me when I
asked you those questions at the time of your
deposition. Start with line 2. 44,. line 2.
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"Question: Now, do you claim that
you've had increased cost and expenses since
the time of the decree of divorce?
"Answer:

No, I don't.

"Question: Do you agree that the cost
or what the judge determined at the time of
trial was your legitimate living expenses are
still your legitimate living expenses?
"Answer: My living expenses at the time
of the divorce were based on six people
living in the household,
"Question:

Have your expenses gone

down?
"Answer: Well, they have. There are
just four people in the household,
down.

"Question: How much have they gone
Answer that percentages.

"Answer: Two-sixths. Two-sixths worth.
Ifm talking about household expenses. I'm
not talking about overall expenses because he
was a very expensive man to live with.
"Question: But your household expenses
since the time of the entry of decree of
divorce have gone down one-third. Two-sixths
is one-third.
"Answer: I know. I'd say my household
expenses have gone down exactly that amount."
Where those the questions and answers
that you gave to me when I asked you those
questions?
A. Yes. I'm referring to utilities
type of expenses.
Q.

Household expenses?

A.

Utility and food type things.

(Transcript, page 128, lines 7-25; page 129; page 130, lines
1-20. )
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8.

Subsequent to the divorce, Brent Brown was forced to

liquidate assets awarded him in the divorce to meet support
obligations.

(Transcript, page 141, lines 19-25; page 142,

line 1.)
9.

Subsequent to the divorce, Brent Brown repurchased

Integrated Systems Engineering, a business he established, ran,
and sold prior to the divorce.

(Transcript, page 19, lines 16-

25; page 20; page 21, lines 1-10; page 24, lines 4-20.)

In order

to rebuy Integrated Systems Engineering, Brent Brown took out
loans for the down payment and had to liquidate almost all of the
remaining assets he had been awarded in the divorce decree to pay
the loans.
10.

(Transcript, page 142, lines 2-15.)

To meet the support obligations and to pay back the

loans on the down payment, Brent Brown liquidated approximately
$56,000.00 in marketable securities, land, and an airplane.
(Transcript, page 162, lines 12-25; page 163; page 164, lines
1-19. )
11.

Brent Brown testified his current earnings are

$6,000.00 per month plus $150.00 per month in dividends.
(Transcript, page 149, lines 17-24; page 167, lines 17-23.)
12.

Brent Brown testified that his expenses have increased

commensurate with his income and he is still short from month to
month, forcing continued liquidation of assets.

(Transcript,

page 149, lines 17-25; pages 150-158; page 159, lines 1-11;
Plaintiff's Exhibit #4.)

As testified by Brent Brown in response

to questions from his counsel:
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Q. Now, if you take your monthly
expenses and add them up, there's about
$5,210. And if you look at when you say you
have about 4,000 a month by declaring your
withholding tax at the end of the year, you
still run short. Have you noticed that?
A.

Oh, yes.

Q. How have you--what have you been
doing to be able to handle your monthly
expenses?
A. Borrow, liquidate. Had to liquidate
assets and in some cases borrow money.
Q. Okay. Now, as you look back from
the time of the decree, the time the decree
was entered until now, have your monthly
expenses increased?
A.

Yes.

(Transcript, page 158, lines 20-25; page 159, lines 1-8.)
13.

Brent Brown continues to maintain life insurance as

required under the decree.
14.

(Transcript, page 155, lines 16-18.)

Brent Brown has paid on college tuition and books and

mission expense for the two children who are no longer minors.
(Transcript, page 158, lines 7-19.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court's finding of a change in circumstances

based on an increase in Brent Brown's income, failing to
recognize a commensurate increase in Brent Brown's expenses,
Brent Brown's liquidation of assets, a decrease in the needs of
Geraldine Brown and the children, and the absence of reasonable
efforts by Geraldine Brown to work or even obtain an education or
training was an abuse of discretion and a misapplication or
misunderstanding of the law.

Where Geraldine Brown has the
-10-

burden to show a substantial change of circumstances, and has
failed to her burden, the order and judgment should be reversed.
2.

Even if there was a substantial change in circumstances,

the trial court abused its discretion in increasing alimony and
child support and should be reversed where the evidence showed a
decrease in the needs of Geraldine Brown and the children, no
reasonable efforts on the part of Geraldine Brown to employ,
educate or train herself, and no attempts by Geraldine Brown to
sell the house awarded her in the divorce, valued at $275,000,00,
and much too large for Geraldine Brown's and the children's
needs.
3.

The lack of findings by the trial court on Geraldine

Brown's and the children's needs and Geraldine Brown's ability to
provide for herself is also reversible error.
4.

Finally, there being no evidence or findings of

Geraldine Brown's need for payment of her attorney fees by Brent
Brown, the trial court abused its discretion and misapplied or
misunderstood the law and the order of attorney fees should be
reversed.
ARGUMENT
I
WHERE GERALDINE BROWN'S AND THE CHILDREN'S
EXPENSES DECREASED AND BRENT BROWN'S EXPENSES
INCREASED COMMENSURATE TO HIS INCOME, THERE
WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH WOULD WARRANT A MODIFICATION OF THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE.
Geraldine Brown's own testimony at trial was that Geraldine
Brown's and the children's expenses at the time of the
-11-

modification hearing were the less than at the time of the
divorce,

Geraldine Brown testified the current support and

income from her investments roughly equaled the expenses for her
and the children.

Further, Geraldine Brown testified she had

never looked for a job, in three years had only taken four
college courses, needed eight years to finish college, after
which she would look for employment, and had made no attempts to
sell her $275,000 house.
The only factor the trial court specifically considered with
respect to its increase in alimony and child support was Brent
Brown's increase in income from $54,000.00 at the time of the
decree to $72,000.00 at the time of the modification hearing.
Apparently ignored was the increase in expenses.

The only reason

Brent Brown is making more money is he put at risk all of the
assets.

If he had just taken a regular job at $54,000.00 per

year, he still would have the income from his investments and no
change of circumstances.
In order for the trial court to order a modification of
alimony or child support, there must first be a finding of a
substantial change in circumstances.

As stated by the Utah

Supreme Court in Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980):
"A trial court is justified in modifying a prior decree of
divorce where the parties [sic] seeking modification proves a
substantial and permanent change of circumstances necessitating
the modification."

619 P.2d at 1376.
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The burden of showing a substantial change of circumstances
is on the moving party.
1297 (Utah 1981).

Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d

In this case, Geraldine Brown was the moving

party and it was her burden to show a substantial change of
circumstances.
The only change in circumstances shown by Geraldine Brown in
this case is that Brent Brown earned more money than at the time
of the decree.

For the trial court to base a finding of a

substantial change on a change in income only, without
consideration of increased expenses of the payor and the
financial circumstances of the payee and the children, is an
abuse of discretion and a misunderstanding or misapplication of
the law.
In Porco v. Porco, 79 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1988),
the Utah Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's ruling that
there was not a substantial change of circumstances where
"expenses have also increased proportionately" to income.

ibid.

Brent Brown's income has increased, but he has also re-purchased
a business, remarried, and purchased a home, and consequently has
greater expenses, as he testified at trial.
In Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853 (Utah 1984), the Supreme
Court gave the following analysis:
Mrs. Lord claims that she has shown a
sufficient change in circumstances since the
original divorce decree to warrant an
increase in child support for the three
children residing with her. The change in
circumstances cited by Mrs. Lord include: an
increase in Mr. Shaw's income; an increase in
the cost of living; an increase in the needs
-13-

of the children now that they are older; and
increased housing expenses. The following
facts cut against Mrs, Lord: Mr. Shaw f s
remarriage and his responsibility to his
step-children; the increased cost of living
which also affects Mr. Shaw; Mrs. Lord's
remarriage; the completion of Mrs. Lord's
education; and Mr. Shaw's support of his
three older children who are living with him.
Based on these circumstances, the trial court
held that a sufficient change in
circumstances had not been shown to warrant a
reassessment of the child support payments.
Parties to a divorce decree will undoubtedly
experience economic and other changes
following a divorce, but a modification in
the decree is justified only when a party
shows a substantial change in circumstances.
682 P.2d at 856.
As was the case in Lord, supra, there were economic changes
in this case since the decree.

While it is true that Brent

Brown's income increased only because of liquidation of assets to
invest in his business, it is also true that his expenses
increased.

On the other hand, Geraldine Brown's economic

situation remained stable—she suffered no decline in income,
neither she nor the children suffered any want of need nor
produced any evidence that they were in need of additional
support.

Geraldine Brown's expenses were less than when the

decree was entered.

Geraldine Brown still remained out of the

work force and made only token efforts to obtain education or
training.
In the plain language of Kiesel, supra, there must be "a
substantial and permanent change of circumstances necessitating

-14-

the modification."

A change in the payor's income does not of

itself "necessitate" a modification.
The evidence in this case is not sufficient for a finding of
a substantial change of circumstances by the trial court.

In so

finding, the trial court abused its discretion and misunderstood
or misapplied the law and the order of increased alimony and
child support should be reversed.
II
WHERE THE DECREE PROVIDED FOR "TEMPORARY
ALIMONY", AND GERALDINE BROWN HAS MADE NO
EFFORT OR ONLY TOKEN EFFORT TO OBTAIN AN
EDUCATION OR TRAINING, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION ,IN AWARDING AN INCREASE IN
ALIMONY.
At the time of the divorce, both parties were unemployed,
though the trial court imputed $54,000.00 per year income to
Brent Brown.

Since the divorce, Brent Brown re-purchased

Integrated Systems Engineering, committed his assets and energy
to its success, and remarried and purchased a house.

Geraldine

Brown continued to care for the parties' children and remained in
the marital home, but made no effort or only token effort to
obtain employment or to educate or train herself for employment.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the purpose of alimony
at the time of the divorce is to equalize the standard of living
for both spouses, maintain them at their present standard of
living as much as possible, and avoid the necessity of one spouse
receiving public assistance.
(Utah 1983).

Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379

In the lead case of Jones v. Jones, the Court

reiterated the factors to be examined in determining alimony:
-15-

(1)
(2)
(3)

the financial conditions and needs of
the wife;
the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and
the ability of the husband to provide
support.

Jones at 1075.
These criteria were previously adopted in English v.
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 1977), where the Court
stated:
The most important function of alimony is to
provide support for the wife as nearly as
possible at the standard of living she
enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent the
wife from becoming a public charge. English
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977).
The trial court should consider "the
financial conditions and needs of the wife,
the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and the
ability of the husband to provide support."
Id. at 411-12.

See also Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah

App. 1987).
In this case, the decree of divorce fulfilled all of the
criteria set forth by the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of
Appeals.

The decree met the financial needs of Geraldine Brown

as presented by her to the trial court by awarding her alimony in
addition to substantial income producing assets.

The trial court

imputed $54,000.00 per year income to Brent Brown even though he
was unemployed.

By awarding temporary alimony, the trial court

presumably expected that Geraldine Brown would take reasonable
steps to educate, train, and employ herself to assist in her own
support.

-16-

Just as Brent Brown took steps to meet his obligations under
the decree of divorce by gaining employment, which required him
to liquidate assets and take out loans, so too should Geraldine
Brown be required to take responsibility for her own support and
make similar efforts to get an education and/or training for
employment sufficient to support herself so that she is no longer
a burden to Brent Brown or the state.

The record is clear that

unlike Brent Brown, Geraldine Brown has failed to make good faith
efforts to meet her own support responsibilities.

A finding of

Brent Brown's good faith efforts to regain employment and
fulfillment of his support obligations and Geraldine Brown's
failure to seek education, training or employment in order to
assist in the support of her and the children and liquidation of
the home which far exceeds her needs, should, at the least,
preclude a modification increasing her alimony.

At most, it

should be the basis for an admonition by the Court for Geraldine
Brown to begin the necessary steps to eventually be able to
provide for her own support.
Ill
THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE
FINDINGS ON GERALDINE BROWN'S FINANCIAL
CONDITION AND NEEDS AND HER ABILITY TO
PRODUCE A SUFFICIENT INCOME FOR HERSELF IS
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The court made no findings with respect to Geraldine Brown's
financial condition and needs and ability to support herself.
The law in this area is well settled.

The trial court's failure

to make findings in disputed areas of fact is reversible error.
-17-

As stated by the Court of Appeals in Throckmorton v.
Throckmorton, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (Utah App. 1988):
Moreover, it is reversible error if a trial
court fails to make findings on all material
issues unless the facts in the record are
"'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment.' " Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996,
999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh,
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)).
Utah courts have consistently found an abuse
of discretion in setting alimony when the
trial court failed to make findings on the
financial conditions and needs of the
receiving spouse. See, e.g., Higley v.
Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983)
(remanded since the trial court made no
findings with regard to the receiving
spouse's ability to work); Rusham v. Rusham,
742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (trial
court failed to adequately address the
financial needs of the claimant spouse,
making it necessary for the reviewing court
to remand the issue for further findings).
There being insufficient findings in this case with respect
to the financial condition and needs of Geraldine Brown, and
Geraldine Brown's ability to work, the order increasing alimony
and child support should be reversed.
IV
WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OR FINDING OF
NEED ON THE PART OF GERALDINE BROWN, THE
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING GERALDINE BROWN A JUDGMENT AGAINST
BRENT BROWN FOR ATTORNEY FEES.
Preliminary to an award of attorney fees, the trial court
must make a finding of need.

As quoted in Talley v. Talley, 739

P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated in Huck
v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986):
-18-

"In divorce cases, an

award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence that it is
reasonable in amount and reasonably needed by the party
requesting the award."
The trial court again focused on Brent Brown's income being
greater than that of Geraldine Brown.

Though the Court

recognized in its memorandum decision that Geraldine Brown
received income from the assets and support awarded in the decree
of divorce, the Court did not address the home, which has
substantial value, Geraldine Brown's ability to earn income,
Geraldine Brown's expenses, or otherwise determine Geraldine
Brown's need.
Where Geraldine Brown's resources were sufficient for her to
pay her own attorney fees, and the Court failed to make specific
findings showing a need on the part of Geraldine Brown, the award
of attorney fees should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Brent Brown respectfully requests that the Order and
Judgment modifying the Decree of Divorce as to alimony and child
support and awarding Geraldine Brown a judgment against Brent
Brown for her attorney fees be reversed.
Dated this *-*

day of August, 1989.
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN

ItfYLE W. HIL
Attoimey for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed the foregoing Brief of
Appellant, postage prepaid, to Defendant/Respondent's attorney,
Stephen W. Jewell, at First Security Building, Third Floor, 15
South Main, Logan, Utah 84321, this
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7~\ * day of August, 1989.
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRENT "W" BROWN,

]

Plaintiff,

)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

;

VS.

GERALDINE K. BROWN,

]
Civil No. 24569

Defendant.

]

THIS MATTER came on for hearing on the 12th day of
March, 1986, before the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen,
District Judge.

Personally appeared the Plaintiff and his

attorney, Lyle W. Hillyard, and the Defendant and her
attorney, George W. Preston; the parties were sworn and
testified and documentary evidence was presented; the Court
having heard the testimony of the parties continued the matter
until March 14, 1986, at which time, counsel presented their
closing arguments and the Court rendered its decision, and
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the parties are now and have been for three

months immediately preceding the filing of this action
residents of the County of Cache, State of Utah.
2.

That the parties were married to each other on the

25th day of June, 1965, in Salt Lake City, Utah, andJiave_be£n

Number

r^V-Aifr'Y-

and now are husband and wife.

fiEO MAR28198G

lIK

SETH S. AUJEMf Cterll
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3.

That four children have been born as issue of this

marriage, three of whom are minors, to-wit:

LISA BROWN, born

June 6, 1969, CLIFFORD BROWN, born September 3, 1975, and
JENNIFER ANN BROWN, born September 8, 1981, and no more
children are expected.
4.

That Defendant is a fit and proper person and

should be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor
children, subject to liberal and reasonable visitation rights
of the Plaintiff.
5.

That during the course of the marriage, Plaintiff

has been the recipient of cruel treatment by the Defendant
causing him great mental and physical distress and upset and
making it impossible for him to remain married to the
Defendant.
6.

That this marriage has deteriorated and there is no

possibility of reconciliation; therefore, the statutory
waiting periods before this divorce is heard or made final
should be waived.
7.

That although Plaintiff is currently unemployed,

his past work record and potential means that he is reasonably
expected to obtain employment in the very near future at
$54,000 per year, upon which child support is set at $300 per
month per child, payable one-half on the 5th and one-half on
the 20th of each month.

That the Defendant should be ordered

to execute any papers necessary to allow Plaintiff to claim
the children as income tax deductions.
Findings and Conclusions - Page 2
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8.

That Plaintiff should pay to Defendant the sum of

$200 per month as and for temporary alimony notwithstanding
Plaintiff's unemployment.
9.

That Plaintiff should maintain any health and

accident insurance that he now has for the benefit of the
children and Defendant; and, if he becomes employed and health
and accident insurance is available through his employment, he
should maintain that insurance on his children for as long as
there is a child support obligation.

Plaintiff should pay any

major medical or dental expense not covered by insurance in
excess of $600 or more per single incident.

All deductibles

not covered by the health and accident insurance or the first
$600 on a major event, should be split equally between the
parties.
10.

The Plaintiff should maintain his life insurance

with an approximate death benefit value of $88,000, with the
children alone as beneficiaries for as long as there is a
child support obligation.
11.

That the parties have acquired the following

property during their marriage:

Home in North Logan,

$275,000; six acres in North Logan, $95,000, subject to an
approximately $10,000 liability for bringing utility and
irrigation systems to the property previously sold to Dr.
Hawks; one-seventh interest in four acres at 18th North in
Logan, $6,000; one-fourth interest in 28 acres at Bear Lake,

Findings and Conclusions - Page 3
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$15,000; one-fourth interest in the Salt Lake City metal
building, $25,000; two percent interest in 29 acres Temple
View Salt Lake City, $20,000; hangar for aircraft, $10,000;
1985 Buick Park Avenue, $10,000; 1983 Buick Century $4,500;
1981 Buick Riveria, $6,000; 1983 19-foot power boat, $10,000;
1979 aircraft, $80,000; 1985 Ford 1210 tractor and
CM

S accessories, $9,300; 1982 1100 Suzuki motorcycle, $2,000;
X

<

5 profit sharing fund with ISE, $59,212.58; one-half interest in
z

§ BH Leasing, $10,000; silver, $6,000; furnishings in the home
in North Logan, $25,000; personal property with the Plaintiff,
Z $3,550; furnishings in Plaintiff's apartment, $2,390;
X

H severance pay from Brae Corporation, $20,000; income tax
<

£ refund 1985 subject to any tax payable and costs of
o preparation, approximately $2,200; IRA accounts with $6,372 in
U)

| Plaintiff's name and $4,840 in Defendant's name; Merrill Lynch
<

^ accounts, $191,679.69; and North Park Bank stock, no value.
o
-j

S
<
>

That the Defendant should be awarded the home, valued

i at $275,000, the Buick Century, Buick Riveria, and the Ford
U)
gtractor and accessories, valued at $19,800; and the
n
u
0

furnishings in the home valued at $25,000 and the North Park

<

Bank stock of no value; and the Defendant should be awarded
the balance of the property except for the Brae severance pay
which should be split between the parties, the net income tax
refund, which should be split between the parties, and each
party should be awarded their IRA accounts with the Plaintiff
paying to the Defendant $766 for the difference.
Findings and Conclusions - Page 4
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should be awarded $108,016.13 of the $191,679.69 of the
Merrill Lynch account for 56.352 percent of the said fund.
12.

Each party should pay their own attorney fees and

costs of court.
13.

Each party should execute any and all documents

required to transfer title as necessary.
The Court having made its Findings of Fact, makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That Plaintiff should be awarded a decree of

divorce from Defendant to become final upon signing.
2.

That Defendant should be awarded the care, control

and custody of the minor children, to-wit:

LISA BROWN,

CLIFFORD BROWN, and JENNIFER ANN BROWN; subject to liberal and
reasonable visitation rights of the Plaintiff.
3.

That a judgment and decree should be entered in

conformance with the foreging Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.
DATED this 2 f7

day of March, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

VeNoy Christaffersen
District Judge
APPROVED AS T0EOEE1L

Geprge W. Preston
Attorney for Defendant
Findings and Conclusions - Page 5
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YARD. L O W & A N D E R S O N

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT' OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRENT M W" BROWN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

;)

DECREE OF DIVORCE

]

GERALDINE K. BROWN,

]
Civil No. 24569

Defendant.

]

THIS MATTER came on for hearing on the 12th day of
March, 1986, before the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen,
District Judge.

Personally appeared the Plaintiff and his

attorney, Lyle W. Hillyard, and the Defendant and her
attorney, George W. Preston; the parties were sworn and
testified and documentary evidence was presented; the Court
having heard the testimony of the parties continued the matter
until March 14, 1986, at which time, counsel presented their
closing arguments and the Court rendered its decision, and
having heretofore made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law now makes and enters the following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the Plaintiff, BRENT "W" BROWN, is hereby

granted a decree of divorce from the Defendant, GERALDINE K.
BROWN, to become final upon signing hereof.
2.

That the Defendant is hereby awarded the care,

custody and control of the minor children, to-wit:

LISA

BROWN, born June 6, 1969, CLIFFORD BROWN, born September 3,

-7-

1975, and JENNIFER ANN BROWN, born September 8, 1981, subject
to liberal and reasonable visitation rights of the Plaintiff.
3.

That Plaintiff is ordered to pay child support at

$300 per month per child, payable one-half on the 5th and onehalf on the 20th of each month.

That the Defendant is ordered

to execute -any papers necessary to allow Plaintiff to claim
CM

S the children as income tax deductions.
<

4.

YD

That Plaintiff is ordered to pay to Defendant the

Z

3 sum of $200 per month as and for temporary alimony
-j

iE notwithstanding Plaintiff's unemployment.
X

o

K

5.

That Plaintiff is ordered to maintain any health

X

H and

accident insurance that he now has for the benefit of the

<

jn children and Defendant; and, if he becomes employed and health
oand accident insurance is available through his employment, he
u)
x

§ shall maintain that insurance on his children for as long as
<

$ there is a child support obligation.
o

Plaintiff shall pay any

.j

Qmajor medical or dental expense not covered by the health and
<

ij accident insurance in excess of $600 or more per single
i

j«j incident. All deductibles not covered by insurance or the
first $600 on a major event, shall be split equally between

0

<
J

the parties.
6.

The Plaintiff is ordered to maintain his life

insurance with an approximate death benefit value of $88,000,
with the children alone as beneficiaries for as long as there
is a child support obligation.

Decree of Divorce - Page 2
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7.

That the Defendant is awarded the following

property of the parties:

Home in North Logan valued at

$275,000; the Buick Century, Buick Riveria, and the Ford
tractor and accessories, valued at $19,800; the furnishings in
the home valued at $25,000; one-half of the Brae severance
pay; one-half of the 1985 net income tax refund; her IRA
2 account plus $766 as the difference between her account and
X

<

3 Plaintiff's account; the North Park Bank stock and her
z

S personal effects; and $108,016.13 of the $191,679.69 of the
f Merrill Lynch account for 56.352 percent of said fund.
X

o

H

8.

That the Plaintiff is awarded all other property of

X

t the parties including the six acres in North Logan, $95,000;
<

£ one-seventh interest in four acres at 18th North in Logan,
o $6,000; one-fourth interest in 28 acres at Bear Lake, $15,000;
<n
x

§ one-fourth interest in the Salt Lake City metal building,
<

$$25,000; two percent interest in 29 acres Temple View Salt
o

gLake City, $20,000; hangar for aircraft, $10,000; 1985 Buick
i Park Avenue, $10,000; 1983 19-foot power boat, $10,000; 1979
0 aircraft, $80,000; $9,300; 1982 1100 Suzuki motorcycle,
§
$2,000; profit sharing fund with ISE, $59,212.58; one-half

<

interest in BH Leasing, $10,000; silver, $6,000; personal
property with the Plaintiff, $3,550; furnishings in
Plaintifffs apartment, $2,390; one-half of his severance pay
from Brae Corporation; one-half of the 1985 net income tax
refund; his IRA account; his personal effects; and the balance
of the Merrill Lynch account.
Decree of Divorce - Page 3
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9.

Each party is ordered to pay their own attorney

fees and costs of court.
10.

Each party is ordered to execute any and all

documents required to transfer title as necessary.
DATED this --' /

day of March, 1986.
BY THE COURT:
i

I

,

I

i

VeNoy Christbffersen
District Judge
j

i
APPROVED AS TO FORM: /

Jr >- . ^, / -

V

GeorgeAW. Preston
Attorney for Defendant

Decree of Divorce - Page 4
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

BRENT "W" BROWN,

)

Plaintiff

]

MEMORANDUM DECISION

v.
1

Civil No.

24569

GERALDINE K. BROWN,
Defendant

The parties were divorced in March of 1986•

The Plaintiff

prior to divorce was a partner in a company called Intergrated
Systems Engineering which he later sold and was taken on as an
employee by the purchaser.

Testimony indicated that the year

prior to the divorce when he was in this situation his income
was $100,000.00+ annually.

At the time of the divorce, his incom..

was zero having terminated any employment.

At that time, based

on the prior track record of the plaintiff, indicated that he was
not going to remain at zero income and indicated that he had the
ability to generate income.
The Court estimiated an income of at least historically of
$54,000.00 minimum.

An alimony order of $200.00 per month was

granted based upon that projection and $300.00 per month per child
support for three children.

It was estimated that he would soon be

making again substantial monies was correct and was a conservative
estimate because the evidence shows that the year after his divorce
he purchased Intergrated Systems Engineering himself and his own
personal financial statement submitted to a bank in September,

-11-

Brown v. Brown
Civil No. 24569
Page Two

1988 he declares now a net worth of $1,157,000.00 and an annual
income of $130,000.00 per year.
The defendant has filed a Petition

based on this change of

circumstances for an increase in child support and alimony.
Defendant has submitted as Exhibit 4, a financial statement updated
from the September 19 8 8 Financial Statement he submitted to the
bank in which he declares his monthly income of $10,000.00 per mo:*
as only $6,000.00.

The Court recognizes that financial statements

submitted to banks for purposes of loans are probably inflated and
that financial statements submitted to the Court in divorce actions
are probably deflated, and the figure is somewhere inbetween.
The Court finds that in any event that there is a substantial
change of circumstances in the defendant's income and it does not
appear simply to be coincidental that his income the year before his
divorce was in the $100,000.00+ category annually and no income at
the time of divorce and then two years later his income is in the
$130,000.00 range at least so reflected on the statements submitted
to the bank last September.
The Plaintiff testified that there was several reasons lor the
decrease in his projected earnings in September, 19 8 8 and his new
present financial declaration.

Mainly being the type of business

he has and the necessity of liquidation of assets and the necessity
of decreasing his own income
problems.

monthly because of the business

He eliminated his bonuses, and has liquidated his stocks

wherein he had formerly received interest and dividend income.

If

-12-
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this was because of the Petition for Modification was filed of ccurs
is not known and the Court will not assume that to be the case.
However, the Court feels his present financial declaration which
is his Exhibit 4, is more conservative than his actual income.
The Court feels that the $130,000.00 on his financial statement of
September 19 88 which is defendant's Exhibit 3 is probably inflaLed,
The Court will depart from the established guidelines because
of the factor of the debt structure that was testified to by the
plaintiff in his business that he now solely cvns but will joe J^c
$72,000.00 September figure deducting therefrom the bonus commission
and dividend income and arrive at a figure of $700.00 per month per
child as the modified order on child support payments.

The Court

feels this is equitable taking into account the debt structure of
Integrated Systems Engineering from where he received his income.
As factors on alimony you have to take into account his increased
ability to provide the standard of living
his income taking

-that is now compatabie with

into account those factors listed in the English

case, the Jones case, and the Nelson case, taking

into account

to try to maintain as close as you can the same standard of living
at this time as was available before and an ability at the present
time to pay and the needs of the defendant.

The Court will therefor:

increase the alimony award to $500.00 per month.
Defendant is also asking attorneyfs fees for this.

Section

30-3-3 of the U.C.A. has been interpreted to include actions for

-13-
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Modification.

See Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2nd 641.

Plaintiff's

ability to pay attorney's fees is obviously much greater than
that of the defendant, the defendant only having the income that
she realizes from investment of funds she received from the divorce
plus her child support and alimony.

Defendant's counsel testified

as to the hours and the necessity of the amount of hours for
purpose of his hearing and the reasonableness of his hourly fee
and with the figure of around $4,000.00 attorney!s fees.

However

in checking over his Exhibit showing the amount of time spent,
namely concerning the cost of the curb or gutter.

The Court feels

there are some items that were not necessary and has therefore
reduced the attorney's fees award to $3,000.00 as opposed to
$4,000.00 plus costs.
Counsel for defendant to prepare the appropriate modification
order.
Dated this

Q

day of March, 19 89.

-14Stephen W- Jewell, 3814
Attorney at. Law
15 South Wairj, Third Floor
First. Security Bank Building
Logan, Utah 34321
Telephone:
i801) 753-2000
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

BRENT •*• BROWN,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs«
GERALDIME k\

BROWN,
Civil No. 24569

Defendant.
This matter came on hearing before the Court, the
Honorable VeMoy Christoffersen presiding, on January 17, 1989,
and again on February 2S#

1989.

Defendant was present and

represented by counsel, Stephen W. Jewellpresent only on February 2Q,

Plaintiff was

1989, and represented by counsel

on January 17, 1989, and February 28, 1989-

The Court having

heard the evidence and testimonies presented and the arguments
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now finds
and concludes as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1»

The parties were divorced on or about. March IS,

2.

Prior t.o the divorce, Plain-till was a partner in a

1986-

company called INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, which he later
sold and was taken on as an employee by the purchaser.
MUH^GI

Number

1'A

FILED

en
TILED
?J!i\r P.''" "*QPQ

A^R

7 1939

-153*

Prior to the divorce, Plaintiff's income was in

ex c ess of £1OO,OOO.00.
4*

At the time ol the divorce. Plaintill's income vas

zero, having terminated any employment*
5.

At the time ol the divorce, based on Plaintiff's

ability to generate income, the Court estimated an income lor
P l a m t i l l ol at least historically $-54,000*00 minimum*

An

alimony order ol S20G.00 p&£ month was granted based on that
projection and $300*GO p&r month lor child support lor three
<3) ch2.1dx&n
6*

vas ordered*

The year following the divorce, or m

or about

December 1986, Plaintiff purchased INTEGRATED SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING himself and currently is the sole owner of
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING.
7.

Plaintiff's net worth as of September

1988, was

approximately $1,157* 000* OO.
8*

Although Plaintiff r&presented on a financial

statement to Zion's First National Bank dated September 15,
1988, that his annual income was $130,000*00 p&T year.
Plaintiff testified at trial that his annual income was
actually only $72,000*00*

The court recognizes that financial

statements submitted to banks for purposes of loans are
pirobably inflated and that financial statements submitted to
the Court in divorce actions are pirobably deflated and that
Plaintiff's income is somewhere m

between those two figures*

The court, however, d&aloLn&s, to establish an exact income
figure*

-169.

It does not appear simply to be coincidental that

Plaintiff's income the year before his divorce was in the
$100,000.00 plus range annually and no income at the time of
the divorce, and then tvo years later his income is again in
the $130,000.00 range, or at. least, so reflected on the
statement, submitted "to the bank in September of 1988.
10.

The Court, finds

that, in any event there is a

substantial and material change of circumstances in that
Defendant*s income has increased substantially from the time
of the divorce, sxifficient to warrant a modification of the
d&c,r&& and to grant Defendant's Petition.
11.

The child support as previously ard&T€*d of 5200. 00

p&T month p&T child shall be modified and increased so that
Plaintiff shall pay $700.00 p&r month p&r child for child
support payments.
12.

Although the Court is not specifically following

the established child support guidelines, the Court feels this
is equitable taking into account the debt structure of
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING from where Plaintiff receives
his income.
13.

After taking into account as factors on alimony,

Plaintiff*s increased ability to provide the standard of
living that is now compatible with his income, taking into
account those factors listed in the ENGLISH case, the JONES
case, and the NELSON case, and taking into account the Court's
attempt to maintain as close as possible the same standard of
living at this time as was available at the time of the
divorce and an ability at. the pr&s&n-t
3

time for Plaintiff to

-17ptrovxde support, the needs of Defendant.*, and the aDility of
Defendant "to provide her own support, the Court will,
therefore, modify the Decree and xncr&asi€*
from $200.00 p€^T month to $500.00 p^x
14.

the alimony award

month.

The Court finds that the $4,000.00 paid by

Defendant for curb and gutter assessments are the obligation
of the Defendant as the owner of the home and are not the
obligation of Plaintiff.
15.

Defendant's counsel testified regarding attorney's

fees, showing the time spent, the hourly rate charged, and the
necessity of the number of hours spent m
difficulty of the case.

light of the

It was stipulated by counsel for the

Plaintiff that the rate charged was a reasonable on& and was
commonly charged for such actions in th&

community.

The Court

finds that Plaintiff's ability to pay attorney's 1&€^B I S
obviously much greater than that of Defendant, Defendant only
having the income that she realises from investment of funds
she received from the divorce plus her child support and
alimony.

However, m

checking over the exhibit prov^decI by

Defendant's counsel showing the amount of time spent, the
court l&^ls

that there are some items that were not necessary;

namely, concerning the costs of curb and gutter, the Court,
therefore, finds

that a reasonable award of attorney's ±&&s tc

Defendant from Plaintiff JLB $3,000.00, plus costs.
16.

There having been no evidence regarding Plaintiff's

Counterpetition, and a Motion to Dismiss the Counterpetition
having h&&n made by Defendant's counsel at the conclusion of
Plaintiff's case and chief, and Plaintiff indicating his
4

-18intent to withdraw his Counterpetition*

the Court, linds that

the Counterpetition should be dismissed.
17*

The Court- incorporates herein by reference such

other facts and findings as are stated in the Memorandum
Decision dated March 3, 1983*
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters
the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1*

There has been a substantial and material change in

circumstances in Plaintiff's income and ability to provide
child support, and alimony from the time of the d&c>r&&r and
•that said substantial and material change is sufficient to
warrant, a modification of the D&c^r€^€^ of Divorce entered in
this matter*
2*

In view of the substantial and material change in

circumstances* the court concludes that Defendant's Petition
-to Modify as -to child support, and alimony should be granted
and that child support should be increased to $700*00 p&r
month p&r child and that alimony should be increased to
S500*OO p&r month*
3*

The Court further concludes £4*000*00 paid by

Defendant for curb and gutter assessment is the obligation of
Defendant as the owner of the property and* therefore, the
obligation of the Defendant*

Defendant's Petition as to said

curb and gutter assessment should not be granted*
4.

In veiw of the difference in earning ability and

actual income received by both parties* Defendant has
5

-19sufficiently demonstrated the financial ne^&d for attorney 's
fees*

The court, concludes "that. S3 r G D C OO as a reasonable

amount, for attorney's fees and -that, "the number of hours spent.
were necessary in light, of -the difficultly of "the case,, the
rate charged for attorney's fees vas reasonable as stipulated
by opposing counsel and is commonly charged for divorce
actions in the community and that, the award of attorney's fees
is based on the need and results acheived in the case*
5-

Plaintiff's Counterpetition should be dismissed.

6.

The Order and Judgment entered in this matter shall

be effective as of January 17, 1989.
7.

The Court incorporates herein by r&I&T&nc&

such

other conclusions of law as are stated in the Memorandum
Decision dated March 3, 1989.
DATED this

1

day of Jbwecfc. 1989.

VeNoy CY*T-ls>-ta±±errs&n
District Judge

6

-20CERTIFICATE OF WAILING
I hereby certify "that, on the Z>j) — day of March, 1989, I
mailed a -true and correct, copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact, and Conclusions of Law and Notice t.o the foregoing
persons, postage pre-paid thereon, by depositing in the United
States Mail*

Richard £L Johnson
Attorney at Lav
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Grew, UT 84058
Brent W. Brown
1622 East 1080 North
Logan, UT 84321

V

A

NOTICE
Counsel for Plaintiff is hereby notified that piursuant to
Rule 4-5G4<2>

of the Utah Code of Judicial

Administration,

counsel has five (5) days to submit any objections to the
Court*
DATED this^r^^2_ day of March, 1989.
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-21-

St ephen W. Jewell, 3814
Attorney for Defendant.
15 South Main, Third Floor
First. Security Bank Building
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone:
< 801) 753-2000
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

BRENT * W

BROWN,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

*•

GERALDIME K\

BROWN,
Civil No. 24569

Defendant This matter came on for hearing before the Court, the
Honorable VeMoy Christoffersen presiding, on January 17, 1983,
and again on February 23, 1989.

Defendant was present and

represented by counsel, Stephen W„ Jewell.

Plaintiff was

present only on February 28, 1989, and represented by counsel
on January 17, 1989, and February 28, 1989.

The Court having

heard the evidence and testimonies pre*, ^nted and the arguments
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and
having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, now makes the following Order and Judgment.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AMD DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The First Cause of Action and Second Cause of

Action in Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce,
regarding child support and alimony respectively, shall be and
are hereby granted.

Number

FILED

^ ^

N<J ^0£f

FlLEC

-222.

It as ordered that, child support, shall increase

from $300.OO to $700.GO p&r month p&r child*
3.

It is further ordered that alimony shall increase

from $200.00 to $500.00 pter month.
4.

Said modified child support and alimony payments

shall be paid effective as of January 17, 1989, and Defendant
is granted a 3udgment against Plaintiff for all amounts owing
from that date to the date of this order.
5.

The Third and Fourth Causes of Action in

Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce regarding
road assessments and withholding of child support and punitive
damages shall be and are hereby denied.
6.

Defendant shall be and is hereby awarded a }udgment

against Plaintiff as and for attorney's fees in the amount of
$3,000.OO.
7.

All other provisions of the D&CT-&& entered

previously in this action shall remain as stated.
8*

Plaintiff's Counter-Petition is denied and the same

shall be and is hereby dismissed.
DATED this

^

day of Ife^eh^ 1989.

BY THE COURT:
/I

VeNoy C h ^ d s t o ^ f e j r s e n
D i s t r i c t : Judge

-23CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
^ .
I hereby certify that on the O ^ ^ T day °* March, 1989, I
mailed a true and correct copy oi the foregoing Order and
Judgment and Notice to the foregoing p€>r&an&> postage pre-paid
thereon, by depositing in the United States Mail*

Richard B. Johnson
Attorney at Lav
1327 South SOO East, Suite 300
Orem, UT S4Q58
Brent W» Brovn
1622 East 1080 North
Logan, UT 84321

it^jfcu-NOTICE

Counsel for Plaintiff is hereby notified that pursuant to
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
counsel has five (5) days to submit any objections to the
CourtDATED this

day of March, 1989-
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